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Civil Procedure.  Gallop v. Adult Correctional Institutions, 218 
A.3d 543 (R.I. 2019).  Where a plaintiff serving a life sentence files
suit over an attack that occurred while the Plaintiff was in pretrial
detention, and where that complaint was dismissed by the trial
court under the state’s civil death statute, the state’s “raise-or-
waive” rule controls the issue.  Here, the “raise-or-waive” rule
means that Plaintiff has waived the argument that the trial justice
erred in failing to address his contention that the state’s civil death
statute is unconstitutional.
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On May 12, 2010, a jury convicted Dana Gallop (Plaintiff) of 
first-degree murder, felony assault, using a firearm when 
committing a crime of violence, carrying a pistol without license, 
and possession of arms by a person convicted of a crime of violence 
who is a fugitive from justice, and declared him a habitual 
offender.1  The trial justice sentenced him to two mandatory 
consecutive life sentences, in addition to a twenty-year sentence to 
be served consecutively with the second life sentence, and two ten-
year sentences to run concurrently with the first life sentence.2  
Plaintiff appealed and the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed.3 
The present case came before the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
on October 2, 2019, and sprung from an incident that allegedly took 
place on April 26, 2010.4  The Plaintiff alleged that he was attacked 
by a fellow inmate, Rosado, while detained by Adult Correctional 
Institutions (ACI) and while awaiting trial on multiple counts 
related to a fatal shooting in Providence.5  Plaintiff alleged that as 
a result of the attack he suffered lacerations and permanent facial 
1. Gallop v. Adult Correctional Institutions, 218 A.3d 543, 545 (R.I. 2019).
2. Id.
3. Id. (citing State v. Gallop, 89 A.3d 795, 806 (R.I. 2014)).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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scarring.6  Plaintiff alleged that the attack was made possible 
because Rosado reported his intent to attack Plaintiff to a 
correctional officer; that the officer spread the word of the planned 
attack among “various ‘John Doe’ defendants” beforehand; and 
finally that the officer “abandoned his post for eighteen minutes . . . 
to afford Rosado the opportunity to carry out the assault.”7 
On November 10, 2010, Plaintiff filed a civil complaint naming 
various defendants, including the State of Rhode Island and ACI, 
and alleging negligence for failing to properly protect him, in 
addition to several other tort claims.8  On April 11, 2013, Plaintiff 
filed an amended complaint that added two named defendants.9  
Significantly, Plaintiff’s amended complaint did not add any state 
or federal constitutional claims.10 
The day before the trial was to start, the trial justice sua 
sponte11 raised the issue of Rhode Island’s civil death statute based 
on Plaintiff’s consecutive life-imprisonment sentences.12  
Defendants moved to dismiss the case under section 13-6-1 on the 
theory that the Plaintiff was civilly dead.13  The Plaintiff objected 
and motioned for leave to file a second amended complaint, this 
time adding a claim alleging violations of various constitutional 
provisions but containing essentially the same tort allegations as 
before.14  The trial justice granted the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss based on section 13-6-1 and did not address the Plaintiff’s 
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.  “As part of that initial complaint, plaintiff also alleged several ad-
ditional common law tort claims, including intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, conspiracy and joint enterprise resulting in assault and battery, im-
plied breach of warranty, failure to maintain ‘protective responsibilities[,]’ and 
a violation of plaintiff’s civil rights.”  Id. 
9. Id.
10. Id. at 546.
11. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “sua sponte” as “[w]ithout prompting or
suggestion; on its own motion.”  Sua sponte, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th 
Pocket ed. 2016). 
12. Gallop, 218 A.3d at 546; see also 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-6-1 (civil death
mandates that persons serving life sentences “shall be deemed to be dead in all 
respects, as if his or her natural death had taken place at the time of the con-
viction” and prohibits them from asserting civil actions). 
13. Id.
14. Id.
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motion for leave to file a second amended complaint.15  The plaintiff 
appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.16 
The court held that the Plaintiff’s civil rights were 
“extinguished by operation of law once his criminal conviction was 
affirmed” and, because there was no constitutional challenge to 
section 13-6-1, Plaintiff’s argument was confined to the federal civil 
rights actions.17  Because the trial justice had dismissed the case 
without addressing the Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, the 
court vacated the judgment and remanded it with directions to hear 
and decide the Plaintiff’s motion.18 
On remand, Plaintiff presented the arguments in reverse, 
arguing first that section 13-6-1 is unconstitutional and thus that 
his federal civil rights claims should go forward.19  Plaintiff then 
argued in the alternative that even if the federal civil rights claims 
were disallowed, the tort claims should proceed because section 13-
6-1 is unconstitutional.20  Finally, Plaintiff motioned for leave to
file a second amended complaint, arguing that there would be no
extreme prejudice to defendants if the motion were allowed.21
Defendants responded by pointing out that Plaintiff’s federal and
constitutional claims were first raised in the proposed second
amended complaint and thus were not properly before the court
and, moreover, that Plaintiff had already had six years to raise
these constitutional claims and had failed to do so.22  The trial
justice ultimately denied Plaintiff’s motion to amend because the
delay caused by filing the second amended complaint would result
in extreme prejudice to the defendants.23  Plaintiff again appealed.
 15     Id. 
16. Id.; see also Gallop v. Adult Correctional Institutions, 182 A.3d 1137,
1141 (R.I. 2018) (holding that “the [civil death] statute unambiguously declares 
that a person such as plaintiff, who is serving a life sentence, is deemed civilly 
dead and thus does not possess most commonly recognized civil rights”). 
17. Gallop, 213 A.3d at 546.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review, the court affords great deference to the trial 
justice’s ruling on a motion to amend.24  In this case the court noted 
that it will not disturb a trial justice’s decision to grant or deny a 
motion to amend unless the hearing justice committed an abuse of 
discretion.25  Under this standard of review, the court first 
addressed whether the trial justice properly denied the Plaintiff’s 
motion to amend.  The court noted that after a pleading has been 
amended once, “leave to amend a pleading lies within the sound 
discretion of the trial justice” and need not be granted “when doing 
so would unduly prejudice the non-moving party.”26  Factors 
indicating undue prejudice if a party were allowed to amend include 
“undue delay in seeking to amend the complaint without any 
reasonable explanation . . . or when the amendment would require 
a significant amount of new discovery.”27  Abuse of discretion 
“occurs when a material factor deserving significant weight is 
ignored, when an improper factor is relied upon, or when all proper 
and no improper factors are assessed, but the court makes a serious 
mistake in weighing them.”28   
The court reviewed the record and found that the trial justice 
“properly weighed all factors without allocating weight to any 
improper factor” and that there was “more-than-adequate grounds” 
to support the decision.29  The court noted the trial justice’s 
conclusion that “plaintiff’s undue delay . . . would create substantial 
prejudice to defendants” because of the additional discovery 
required as well as the complexity of the statutory claims.30  The 
court found that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion31 and 
agreed with the trial justice’s denial of the motion “based upon the 
proximity to the trial, additional significant discovery, and other 
24. Id. at 548 (quoting Catucci v. Pacheco, 866 A.2d 509, 513 (R.I. 2005)).
25. Id. (quoting Barrette v. Yakavonis, 966 A.2d 1231, 1236 (R.I. 2009)).
26. Id. (quoting Weybosset Hill Investments, L.L.C. v. Rossi, 857 A.2d 231,
236 (R.I. 2004)). 
27. Id. (quoting Faerber v. Cavanaugh, 568 A.2d 326, 330 (R.I. 2009)).
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pleadings needed in lateness of filing the motion”32 noting that the 
record established “ample grounds supporting the trial justice’s 
decision.”33 
Having found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial 
justice,34 the court moved on to the issue of the constitutionality of 
section 13-6-1 and found that the issue was barred by the state’s 
“raise-or-waive” rule.35  The “raise-or-waive” rule, whereby a party 
“cannot raise an objection or advance a new theory on appeal if it 
was not raised before the trial court,”36 is “staunchly adhered to” by 
the court.37  As part of its analysis, the court considered an 
exception that “arises when basic constitutional rights are 
involved”38 and would apply if “the alleged error [was] more than 
harmless” and “implicate[d] an issue of constitutional dimension 
derived from a novel rule of law that could not reasonably have been 
known to counsel at the time of trial.”39  The court concluded that 
because this case did not involve a novel rule of law that could not 
reasonably have been known to counsel at the time of trial, this case 
did not fall under the exception, and therefore, Plaintiff’s 
opportunity to discuss the constitutionality of section 13-6-1 had 
passed.40 
COMMENTARY 
The facts of this case neatly illustrate a complication created 
by the civil death statute in Rhode Island, namely: if an inmate 
serving a life sentence is considered civilly dead, what redress does 
that inmate have when he or she is injured while serving out the 
life sentence under the state’s care? 
32. Id.
33. Id.  Noting that the trial justice observed that “the case would really
have to start [over] from square one,” the court agreed that plaintiff’s undue 
delay in bringing his new claims would create substantial prejudice for defend-
ants, and that no reasonable explanation for the delay was ever provided by 
plaintiff.”  Id. 
34. Id.
35. Id. at 550.
36. Id. (quoting Cusick v. Cusick, 210 A.3d 1199, 1203 (R.I. 2019)).
37. Id. (quoting Cusick, 210 A.3d at 1204).
38. Id.
39. Id. (quoting In re Miguel A., 990 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I. 2010)).
40. Id.
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On the one hand, such an inmate is clearly alive.  The 
aggregate amount of money it costs the state to take care of the 
inmate—to clothe, house, feed, and care for the inmate when ill—
attest to the fact that the inmate is alive.  So long as he remains in 
the facility, the inmate is also dependent upon the state—he is 
unable to clothe, house, or feed himself.  Moreover, the inmate is 
not stationary or in a fixed position: an inmate quite likely moves 
around the facility and encounters other inmates and staff during 
his day-to-day affairs.  On the other hand, the civil death statute 
means that the inmate is dead “as if his or her natural death had 
taken place at the time of the conviction.”41  Under such 
circumstances it seems inevitable that at some point an accident or 
fight may occur or perhaps negligence on the part of a prison guard, 
janitor, or some employee on the food service staff. 
This situation is untenable: the civil death statute leaves the 
inmate in an impossible position, both “dead” but also very much 
alive and still capable of being physically injured.  Because the 
statute “imposes a complete bar on life-prisoners’ right to access 
courts” it is potentially violative of the Access to Courts Clause of 
the Rhode Island Constitution.42  The statute places the court in 
the awkward position of having to consider how a dead person can 
suffer injury at the hands of the state in whose charge he has been 
entrusted.  In this case, the court seemed caught between a rock 
and a hard place as it explains how a plaintiff who is “civilly dead” 
is also owed “at the very least” a reasoned decision on the motion 
for leave to file an amended complaint.43 
The court pointed out that that the civil death statute has been 
“on the books” since it was enacted in 190944 and “reiterated” the 
principle that “repeal is the province of the Legislature.”45  In the 
end, however, the court held that the plaintiff could only argue his 
constitutional claims if they had been allowed in on a second 
amended complaint, but they were not.  The court’s conclusion that 
the “raise-or-waive” rule controls here seems correct and, further, 
41. See 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-6-1.
42. See James Michael Kovach, Comment, Life and Civil Death in the
Ocean State: Resurrecting Life-Prisoners’ Right to Access Courts in Rhode Is-
land, 24 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 400, 411 (2019). 
43. Gallop, 213 A.3d at 549.
44. Id. at 550.
45. Id. at 546.
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is in keeping with the nature of the rule, which is a “fundamental” 
rule in Rhode Island that is “staunchly adhered to” by the court.46 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that where a plaintiff 
who is serving a life sentence brings suit because he was attacked 
by another inmate during pretrial detention, and the lower court 
already dismissed the claim under the state’s civil death statute, 
the plaintiff has waived the argument that the state’s civil death 
statute is unconstitutional under the “raise-or-waive” rule. 
 Thomas M. Wall 
46. See id. at 550 (quoting Cusick v. Cusick, 210 A.3d 1199, 1203 (R.I.
2019)). 
